This Dark Age

A manual for life in the modern world.

By Daniel Schwindt

NOTICE:
This Dark Age is now available in paperback on Amazon. The print version is MUCH cleaner than this online version, which is largely unedited and has fallen by the wayside as the project has grown. If you’ve appreciated my writing, please consider leaving a review on the relevant paperback volumes. The print edition also includes new sections (Military History, War Psychology, Dogmatic Theology).

Volume 1 | Volume 2 | Volume 3| Volume 4 | Volume 5 | Volume 6

Destiny or dumb luck?

What I’ve already said about America’s almost total lack of ‘true politics’ is true of its inner form, in terms of its participants, the issues at stake, and the mode of operation. This does not mean that the American regime has no relations with the outside world, however. What it does mean is that these relations will be skewed in a similar manner and will represent the ‘other side of the coin’, so to speak.

Just as inner politics in America is little more than a winner-takes-all battle for control of power after the manner of competition between businessmen, with moral, social, religious, and human interests only coming to the front as tools of rhetoric in order to get the masses on board, so also with America’s external politics: in other words, America’s external politics takes on the form of an insatiable imperialism flying under the banner of ideals.

Imperialism means war on all fronts and peace within the sphere of the empire. Empire establishes peace by accepting that war never ends and by leaning into it. The peace of the Roman Empire was a more or less relative peace, peace within the borders but not on them or outside of them. With that said, America has achieved its vast empire with less bloodshed than its historical analogs. Most of this is due to sheer luck. The hardest war America ever fought was against England in the Revolution. Here the colonies were truly overmatched, but it happened that there were other powers to volunteer assistance, namely France; it also happened that England was involved elsewhere and could not devote its entire strength to the suppression of a rebellion across the ocean. Add to that the fact that there was opposition within England which favored the colonies.

The foreign powers in the New World, aside from the English, were France and Spain, but they were each in the twilight of their military strength and were of little concern for the newly independent government. And much like England, France was to prove unable to focus its energies on the maintenance of power in America, especially once Napoleon re-oriented its focus on the re-creation of a European ‘Holy Roman Empire’ rather than a colonial one. This is why the small sum he accepted in the Louisiana Purchase was acceptable to him and was, on the other end, a moment of unbelievable luck for the American union.

The United States interpreted all of these fortuitous circumstances through the narrow lens of its latent politico-Calvinism, which is to say, its ‘collective predestination’ as a member of ‘the elect’ by God Himself. This attitude would remain with the United States permanently, and it explains both its boldness as well as its inability to question the rightness or righteousness of the power it accumulates to itself. No matter what America does, at least in the eyes of Americans, Deus Vult! The elect must rise in the world. This has a double-effect: first, it justifies every political move America makes, since America is identified with Christ-in-the-world and so cannot have bad motivations and cannot be wrong; second, it  means that any opposition to American power is not simple opposition in the political sense, but is an expression of evil plain and simple, and America’s enemies are the personification of Satan sent to persecute the elect.

If we take another instance of grand luck in favor of the early development of American power-the War of 1812—we might actually begin to believe the cant about divine election. In this case Napoleon basically enlisted himself into the cause of American empire. England was far too involved with Napoleon at home to worry too much about America’s involvement and what would have been a superior military position in America became an opportunity for further expansion of the new nation and led directly to the acquisition of Florida in 1819.

Share This